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Restructuring the Defence Industry and
Arms Production in Russia
ANTONIO SA´NCHEZ-ANDRE´S
AT THE BEGINNING OF 1997, after  ve years of failed reforms in the defence industry,
there took place a substantial change in the administrative structure running this
sector. The Ministry of Economic Affairs took over the restructuring of the defence
industry and thereby de ned a new way of tackling reforms in this industrial sector.
Three elements stand out in the new approach: intersectorality, a predominance of
civilian elements and a greater realism. This approach, therefore, represents a break
with the idea in force up to that moment of the best way to tackle problems related
to the defence industry, which was greatly conditioned by its Soviet heritage.
Although two years later this new way of approaching the restructuring of the defence
industry has come under question, it can be claimed that some of the changes
introduced will condition the future industrial policy implemented in this sector.
This article aims to do two things:  rstly, to highlight whether relevant decisions
have been made in the restructuring of this sector during the time it has been under
the control of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and secondly, to point out the
restructuring tendencies once the main objective of this industry, speci cally the
supply of weapons, had been achieved. This article will concentrate only on those
aspects related to domestic weapons demand, this being the element that gives
meaning to the defence industry in itself. In the  rst place, the situation inherited by
the Ministry of Economic Affairs will be set out, as will, in connection with this, the
aims of the restructuring programme. In the second place, the changes which took
place in the sector as a whole will be examined, focusing on considerations of its size
as well as on reforms introduced in the methods of internal reorganisation. Thirdly,
some limits which are relevant to the industrial policy adopted will be pointed out.
The analysis of these issues will be carried out in the light of the de facto priorities
of weapons production, in such a way that it will end by underlining the relationship
between the model of the future Russian defence industry and the production of
weapons necessary to meet the domestic requirements.
The restructuring of the defence industry
Reform precedents
During the Soviet period the administrative structure of the defence industry had
enjoyed some very important privileges, but in 1992 it became a mere section of the
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Ministry of Industry. From this moment onwards it gradually rose in standing
(Rossiiskii, and then Gosudarstvennyi komitet oboronnoi promyshlennosti—GKOP)
until it reached ministry level (Minoboronprom) in May 1996. Nevertheless, in March
1997 this tendency was reversed when Minoboronprom was wound up and part of it
absorbed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
The  rst  ve years of the transition saw a continuity in the approach to the
reforming and restructuring of the defence industry, although mediated by the
capacity for action of the administrative body which was running it. Among the most
important initiatives in the restructuring and adapting of the industry to the new
necessities of arms production are the reduction in the number of organisations linked
to the sector, changes in ownership, and the creation of new organising methods,
especially associations, as well as changes in the statute of state-owned companies.
As regards the reduction in size of the defence industry, the separation of
companies from the sector has been quite limited in spite of the important privatisa-
tion process that took place. The state has continued to play a particularly important
role in the privatised organisations and, as for the state-owned companies, they have
accepted the drop in their number with great reluctance. Sources close to the
GKOP/Minoboronprom estimated that, at the beginning of 1996, there were 525
companies that should not be privatised, and yet, halfway through that year, an
of cial list of 480 defence organisations which were not suitable for privatisation was
approved.1 However, in the middle of 1997 the number of state-owned defence
companies still ran to 738 (see Table 1) and the selling of shares of many
organisations had been paralysed. This means that a more thorough process of
substantial privatisation was needed in the sector.2 This situation becomes more
serious if we consider that the state, through the GKOP/Minoboronprom, did not
achieve effective control over state-owned companies and state ownership in priva-
tised organisations,3 which questions the effectiveness of the restructuring policy.
Another line of restructuring followed by the GKOP/Minoboronprom was the
consolidation of the state-owned organisations by means of a special status: kazennye
predpriyatiya (treasury factories, i.e. fully state-owned companies). This refers to
those companies where the state is entitled to determine their production activity, at
the same time as being ultimately responsible for their  nancial obligations.4 Never-
theless, despite the raising of the hierarchical level of the administrative structure of
the defence industry, the creation of this type of company has been merely anecdotal.
To give a concrete example, at the beginning of 1997 only  ve full state-owned
companies had been set up, in spite of an intention to create 45 such organisations in
1996 and to go on progressively to form some 370.5 On the other hand, as regards
the setting-up of state-owned organisational structures whose nucleus was made up of
a research centre, two types were distinguished; the state scienti c centres (Gosu-
darstvennyi nauchnyi tsentr—GNTs) which carry out research tasks and the federal
scienti c-production centres (Federal’nyi nauchnyi proizvodstvennyi tsentr—FNPTs)
where research, design and production activities (short series)6 will be conducted.
However, up to the beginning of 1997, a total of 17 state scienti c centres and six
federal scienti c-production centres had been created, as the process had been
paralysed almost since the very setting up of Minoboronprom.7
As to the creation of associations,8 their setting-up was promoted although there
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was uncertainty over which legal format to adopt. Many of these associations
intended once again to set up the traditional relationships maintained during the
Soviet period but without any visible priority on the part of the state in this process.
Therefore, quite a few associations appeared but, in the midst of an economic crisis
and a drop in military orders, their existence was rather formal, with a marked internal
instability. To illustrate this, it can be pointed out that up to April 1997 62
 nancial-industrial groups (one of the different types of association) had been created
and legally acknowledged9 and in 23 of these there was some participation by defence
organisations. However, in only 10 was the number of these organisations signi cant
enough to de ne the group pro le by its arms production.
Yet the allocation of orders and the restructuring in the defence industry have been
badly coordinated. On the one hand, a reduction in military orders should be re ected
in a very signi cant concentration in their distribution. Although in 1997 half the
budget for military orders was concentrated in some 50 organisations, the other half
was distributed among some 1200 groups, thereby spreading a substantial part of the
budget among defence organisations with a somewhat dubious claim to arms
production and a questionable capacity to ful l such orders. This is to say that both
the restructuring within the sector and the policy introduced to encourage changes
have been residual despite the sharp fall in military orders and the admission that
these orders would not rise in the future. On the other hand, this is made even more
serious if we take into account payment for military orders. Between 1994 and 1997
the debts accumulated by the state for military orders rose to 16.5 billion rubles, a
 gure equivalent to the volume of orders intended to be placed in 1998 (15.3 billion
rubles).10 This means that the irreversible drop in the volume of military orders has
not only not prompted the restructuring of the defence industry but has also
introduced additional problems related to the rise in non-payment for these orders by
the state. Therefore, the appearance of Minoboronprom has neither contributed to a
rationalisation in military orders nor proved to be any incentive for the defence
industry to adapt itself to the new situation in the country.
At the beginning of 1997 the restructuring in the Russian defence industry was at
a standstill. One of the main reasons for this failure was the maintenance of an
administrative structure and an approach which were very sectionalised and very
sensitive to the interests of traditional pressure groups existing in this industry, in
such a way as to reproduce the Soviet status quo although in a different institutional
context. The disappearance of Minoboronprom and its partial absorption by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs opened up a new era in the restructuring of the defence
industry which allowed a different perspective on the task to be taken.
The aims of the new restructuring
The new defence industry restructuring programme was based on the ‘Conception of
the reform of the defence industry’,11 starting from which a speci c restructuring
programme for this industrial sector would be worked out and a group of decrees or
legal provisions necessary to express it in concrete terms approved. From 1998 to
2000 the necessary changes related to the restructuring in the defence industry would
be put into practice, in particular the essential legal bases would be approved by the
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TABLE 1
SIZE OBJECTIVES IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY
Type of organisation Minoboronprom/GKOPa Ministry of Economy
Forecast of future defence Situation in
industry summer 1998 Forecast 2000
State 525 738 186
Privatised companies
with state participation 888 509 393
Privatised companies
without state
participation 459 502 88
Total 1872 1749 667
Associations 40 32 92
a This is a reform project put forward by sources close to the GKOP and therefore to Minoboronprom
in 1996. Among the state-owned organisations are included 367 fully state-owned companies
(kazennye predpriyatiya), 58 unitary companies (unitarnye predpriyatiya), 40 state scienti c centres
(Gosudarstvennye nauchnye tsentry—GNTs) and 60 federal scienti c-production centres (Fed-
eral’nye nauchnye proizvodstvennye tsentry—FNPTs).
Sources: I. Labrushenkova, & A. Voyakina, ‘Institutsional’nye preobrazovaniya v oboronnom
komplekse’, Voprosy ekonomiki i konversii, 1996, 1, p. 55; NITs PEU, ‘Deistvuyushchaya struktura
oboronno-promyshlennogokompleksa Rossii’. http://www.vpk.ru:8082/www-vpk/vpk/vit/stat4.htm,
January 1998; and Ekspert, 1998, 6, p. 51.
beginning of 1998. The basic aim of the planned restructuring was ful lment of the
long-term state arms programme, 1996–2005, which aimed to cover the country’s
arms requirements.12
One prime characteristic of the new period of reforms in the defence industry
which is worth underlining is that the of cial body in charge of the restructuring
would no longer be Minoboronprom or any other sectoral body closely linked to the
defence sector, but the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Therefore, the application of a
new approach with respect to the reform in this industry was foreseeable. This was
characterised,  rstly, by its emphasis on more intersectoral aspects and, secondly, by
its tackling of the problems from a more civilian perspective while still acknowledg-
ing the strategic peculiarities of the defence sector.13
The restructuring policy takes into account not only the worsening of the defence
industry’s economic situation in 1997 but also the weakening of the armed forces, the
drop in the state’s military orders, as well as the trend (decline tending towards
stabilisation) of the Russian economy in general.14 Consistent with these characteris-
tics, the restructuring programme decided on a signi cant reduction in the size of the
defence industry, as well as a physical change (an increase in the types of ownership
and methods of organisation in the sector).15 Therefore, in the year 2000, the defence
sector would be made up of 667 organisations and the number of associations
(integrated structures) would noticeably increase, which is to say that the defence
sector would experience a signi cant reduction in the number of organisations. The
new defence sector will focus on ful lling a few priorities in high-tech arms
production in such a way as to be a support to the scienti c centres in particular, so
as to avoid their permanent deterioration.16
This restructuring would appear to be guided by several general criteria. The  rst
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is rationalisation of the management and allocation of military orders. To achieve this,
the intention would be to concentrate the military orders in a reduced number of
defence organisations whose production would, essentially, be military. As a result,
a signi cant number of organisations would be left without military orders and
therefore would be excluded from the sector, a phenomenon that would lead to a
substantial decrease in the size of the defence industry.17 This change in the managing
of military orders would mean the creation of a defence industry nucleus which would
be limited to activities related to arms production and national security. This nucleus
should be state-owned. One speci c example would be that, after the restructuring, of
the 2000  rms that traditionally received military orders and gave employment to
some 2.5 million workers, only some 300 organisations and some 900 000 workers
would be responsible for state orders.18 On the other hand, it was assumed that
coherence between the management of orders and the restructuring in the defence
industry presupposed either close coordination between the administrative bodies
involved or that a single body managed the allocation of orders and the organisation
of the industrial restructuring.
The second criterion is making the military production compatible with other
production activities in order to cover internal requirements. Therefore, some defence
organisations will receive military orders but these will only take up part of their
production capacity, so as to allow other activities that could either be of military
character and directed towards exports or could be civilian. The degree of state
control within this group of organisations will be reduced. This is to say that there
would either be privatised organisations with a share in ownership retained by the
state or groups would be created among these organisations, the control over which
would be more  exible. The latter structures would have particular relevance owing
to the fact that they signify a decentralisation in the defence industry’s operational
decision-making process, which is to say less state intervention at company level.
The third criterion is to establish some defence priorities for the production of
certain types of weapons rather than others. Although the setting-up of these priorities
should be explicitly approved in the weapons programme, it is arguable whether they
would have any speci c operational applications, as well as seeming to be con-
ditioned by pressure from the producers themselves, who can introduce signi cant
changes in the decisions which were originally taken.19 Nevertheless, given the
conditions of the new administrative structure, it was assumed that predominance of
the speci c interests of in uential industrial groups within the sector could be
avoided.
The fourth criterion is the introduction of a certain economic rationality within the
sector, the application of which would allow organisations from the central nucleus
of the defence industry to be detached or even liquidated. Thus, on the one hand, we
can point to a reduction in duplicated production or research, opting for concentration
in one organisation, which would in addition allow acquisition, upkeep and repair
costs to be cut without weakening the country’s defensive capability.20 On the other
hand, there was an emphasis on the elimination of production methods which were
inef cient. This was due either to technical considerations, obsolete production
methods or failure of organisations to complete their allotted tasks, or to economic
ones, by which we mean they were not pro table.21 This group also contains some
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organisations that de facto had not had any military orders for a long time, which
questioned whether they could really ful l the desired production requirements. These
factors would lead to the exclusion of a signi cant number of organisations from the
defence industry.
The  fth criterion is to increase state control over the organisations which make up
the defence industry. The power of the state to name the directors of the state-owned
organisations and to name the state representatives in the privatised organisations in
whose ownership the state retains some share was speci cally underlined. This is to
say that the existence of a difference of interest between the the organisations and the
state was assumed. The real control over the defence organisations had, up to that
moment, been an issue which received scant attention, but in the present restructuring
it was given a place of importance.
The sixth criterion is to make the speci c reforms possible by adapting them to the
existing legal framework. In this respect one of the most important elements in the
restructuring refers to the legal status of the state-owned organisations. In the  rst
place, the intention is to create fully state-owned companies (kazennye predpriyatiya)
but, as the state has the  nal say as to the  nancial obligations of this type of
organisation, in the medium term marginal use of this legal form may be expected.22
Moreover, some of the military priorities of the research projects would continue to
be expressed through the establishment of state-owned scienti c centres. Also, one of
the most important elements in the restructuring is the creation of associations
(integrated structures) based on the privatised organisations. One of the special
features of these groups is that they would frequently be coordinated around the
acquisition of speci c products and would include organisations belonging to differ-
ent defence industry sub-sectors in such a way as to eliminate some of the obstacles
linked to traditional departmentalism. Nevertheless, at the moment there is a great
legal vacuum surrounding this area and no legal form is suitable as a back-up to the
restructuring policy.
Preparation of the restructuring programme was completed at the end of 1997,23
although its application was not legally approved until the end of June 1998,24 and
subsequently the  nancial crisis has slowed down the programme’s anticipated
implementation.25 Part of the programme was put into practice immediately after it
was conceived, and it is interesting to note the approval of the restructuring
sub-programme in the  eld of aviation on 4 September 1997, as it would serve as a
trial for the reforms intended to be introduced in the whole sector.26 Subsequently,
other sub-programmes have also been approved, the most important of these being
those in sectors dealing with shipbuilding, radio and electronics, although all of them
are guided by the same principles.27
The results of the rede ning of the state-owned sector
One of the main tasks of the restructuring was the de nition of the group of
state-owned organisations. To this end, the list of 480 plants and scienti c centres
which were not open to privatisation had to be reviewed, and these either consolidated
as state-owned or privatised.28 As regards the former option, the intention was to
promote the creation of fully state-owned companies (kazennye prepriyatiya), yet the
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quantity of resources needed to maintain an organisation of this type still represented
a dif cult obstacle and as a result only the plants which had previously received this
special status were consolidated as such.29 This restructuring process came to a
standstill and, what is more, these companies were only ever partially  nanced.30 As
to the scienti c centres, there has been no advance at all in the creation of new GNTs,
as the same ones exist as at the end of 1995, while as regards the FNPTs, the situation
is different, as at least 12 new groups have been created since the middle of 1997. As
to exclusion from the list of organisations not suitable for privatisation, one of the
most important decisions was taken in the second half of 1997 when the decision to
privatise 26 state-owned companies was taken.31 However, subsequent exclusions
have been very much one-off in nature as, so far, this process has been practically
paralysed.
Decisions taken about the ensemble of privatised defence organisations have had a
far-reaching effect. One of the most important measures adopted in the restructuring
of the whole defence industry has been the placing of representatives with explicit
state-biased interests in privatised defence organisations.32 Two classes of represen-
tatives can be distinguished;  rstly, those placed in the shareholders’ assemblies of
new joint-stock companies and linked to state ownership of blocks of shares, and
secondly, those appointed to the board of directors, related to state ownership of a
golden share in privatised organisations. The appearance of these representatives has
two important implications. Firstly, an increase in effective state control over defence
organisations, which is something that signi es a discrepancy between the interests of
the state and those of the people managing plants and scienti c centres. Secondly, the
body of organisations where explicit state representatives have been designated,
together with the list of organisations that are not suitable for privatisation, clearly
show up where the state’s main interests lie within the defence industry. In this way,
the state’s priorities within the industry are expressed at the same time as real
mechanisms for gaining effective control over the plants and scienti c centres are put
into practice.
Thus, in the middle of 1998, these three lists created the basis for the design of the
future defence sector. There is a central nucleus in the industry made up of 672
organisations (a number equivalent to the 667 which was put forward by the Ministry
of Economic Affairs in the restructuring programme33), among which the true nucleus
is represented by the organisations whose privatisation is forbidden—some 47834—
and there is an extension formed by 194 organisations made up of the bodies where
the state keeps a controlling block of shares. Around this central nucleus there is a
periphery in which we  nd the organisations where the state has a golden share (these
total 192); these, seemingly, will be excluded from the future defence industry. The
remaining organisations from the old defence industry will be freely privatised. This
organisational structure was subsequently strengthened when a list of strategic
defence organisations was approved.35 This updated another list which was approved
in 199536 which, in essence, coincided with the list of privatised organisations where
the state appointed representatives in the shareholders’ assemblies.37 In line with this,
some modi cations in the enlarged defence industry nucleus were introduced, which
were frequently associated with the creation of corporate structures (integrated
structures) but, essentially, the nucleus has kept its initial form.
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TABLE 2
DEFINITION OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY
I. II. III. IV. V.
Second-level
Top-priority priority
State privatised privatised Central Enlarged
companies companies companies nucleus nucleus
Aviation 45 96 14 141 155
Ammunition 93 7 3 100 103
Armament 60 21 30 81 111
Communications 50 (51) 17 27 67 94
Radio 73 17 24 90 114
Space 60 4 8 64 72
Shipbuilding 53 (54) 18 30 71 101
Electronics 44 14 56 58 114
Total 478 (480) 194 192 672 864
Column I. Corresponds to the organisations whose privatisation was prohibited in the 1996 list. In the rows
where there are  gures in brackets those correspond to that list, whereas those which are outside the brackets
are worked out by subtracting the state-owned organisations, those which also appeared in the 1998 list, from
strategic privatised businesses (Column II), which is to say that their privatisation had already been decided
on.
Column II. These are the organisationswhere the state names representatives in the assemblies of shareholders,
a decision derived from the ownership of a block of shares.
Column III. These are the organisations where the state names representatives on the boards of directors (of
the privatised organisations), this being linked to control over the decision-making process derived from the
existence of a golden share.
Column IV. The sum of columns I and II.
Column V. The sum of columns I, II and III.
Sources: Own elaboration from Postanovlenie pravitel’stvo RF ‘O perechne predpriyatii i organizatsii
oboronnogo kompleksa, privatizatsiya kotorykh zapreshchena’, no. 802, 12 July 1996; and Postanovlenie
Pravitel’stva RF ‘O naznachenii predstavitelei gosudarstva v otkrytykh aktsionernykh obshchestvakh
oboronno-promyshlennogokompleksa’, no. 388, 7 April 1998.
Another wide-reaching change that occurred halfway through 1998 was the
reassignment of organisations from the Ministry of Economic Affairs38 to the Russian
Space Agency (Rossiiskoe kosmicheskoe agenstvo—RKA). This change initially
affected 65 organisations, part of whose output was space-related, as well as others,
especially military ones, which did not belong to this sub-sector but which greatly
affected the space programmes.39 The RKA could stimulate part of the restructuring
by privatising, grouping together or excluding these organisations from the defence
industry.40
It is important to point out that the RKA is made up of the organisations most
deeply involved in the production of strategic missiles and, in particular, those which
are developing the Topol’-M programme (SS-27). It must be underlined that, after
experiencing several problems not only in the past41 but even in the present day,42 this
programme enjoys maximum priority within the defence industry. This programme is
itemised separately among the state’s military orders in the federal budget and the
arrears relating to these orders enjoy preference in payment.43 Taking the designation
of the organisations to take part in the construction of these strategic missiles as a
starting point, one of the essential functions of the RKA is to guarantee the ful lment
of this  rst-rank military priority.
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On the other hand, and although after the above-mentioned reorganisation only
some of the space organisations came under the jurisdiction of the RKA, there did
exist a trend towards placing all the plants and scienti c centres in this sub-sector
under the responsibility of this body. It is important to note that the organisations
from the aviation sub-sector were subsequently incorporated into the RKA44 but,
given the heterogeneous nature of the resulting group, which had diverging or even
opposing interests,45 the appearance of internal tensions within the new administrative
body is foreseeable. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that, as the RKA was an
administrative body at an inferior level to the Ministry, the latter still had, in the last
resort, the  nal say over the restructuring in the aerospace  eld.
One aspect that has an important impact on the restructuring is the management of
military orders. To this end, responsibility for placing state military orders was moved
from the Defence Ministry to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, so that the latter
enjoyed a role of greater importance in promoting the sector’s restructuring.46 The
aim was to avoid further  nancial problems and and irregularities in placing orders,
and particularly to deal with the state’s enormous debt to the defence organisations,
by concentrating these issues in one institution only. Thus the intention was to solve
once and for all one of the most serious problems which had appeared in the previous
period of restructuring; the breach existing between the ful lment of military orders,
their  nancial support and the reorganisation of the defence industry. At the same
time, the  rst steps were taken towards tackling the question of weapons standardis-
ation. To this end, a commission whose aim is to optimise military orders has begun
to operate,47 which should develop this vital aspect in order to direct the restructuring
of the defence industry.
One of the aspects of the reorganisation of the defence industry which has received
most attention has been the creation of corporate structures (integrated structures).
The absence of any legislation which would contribute to solving the sector’s
problems has been a dif culty in this regard which has had to be faced. Traditionally,
some of these integrated structures had chosen their names randomly (for example
kontsern, kompleks or korporatsiya), whereas those which enjoy legal status (holding
companies or  nancial-industrial groups—FIG) present too many limitations if they
are to be used as a generalised reference for the sector’s restructuring.48 Given these
legal limitations, and regardless of the name of the integrated structure, the restructur-
ing policy has committed itself to setting up associations. These adopted the legal
form of a limited company where the state owned the majority share, at the same time
as the association took over the shares which the state held in the businesses and
scienti c centres which belonged to the association. In terms of productivity, the
association will coordinate the activities of the member organisations with the aim of
obtaining one or two types of weapons systems and will maintain its decision-making
capacity and control over the property of the member organisations.
Aviation is one sub-sector that has been used as a platform for experimentation. In
1997 a restructuring programme was established for this sub-sector in such a way as
to set up a  rst level of defence associations with a total of  ve to six integrated
structures, where those taking part would be grouped around the assembly of speci c
end products:  ghter planes, helicopters, heavy bombers, etc. These associations
could include, at least, centres of design, experimentation and mass production.
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On the other hand, a second level of associations would be established where there
would be some 10–15 corporate structures and whose aim would be to produce
aircraft accessories, parts or components such as engines, weapons, special materials
etc. Their production, though, would not be exclusively for military purposes.49
Two associations stand out as enjoying the highest prority owing to their connec-
tions with weapons production—AVPK Sukhoi and VPK MAPO, which, more over,
were used as pilot experiments during the restructuring. The rest of the industrial
groups, meanwhile—Il’yushin, Tupolev, Yakovlev and Milya—could take a second-
ary position. AVPK Sukhoi was created during the second half of 1996 and grouped
together the main organisations related to the design and assembly of Su aeroplanes.
The setting-up of the group began in the second half of 1997 when the companies that
were still state-owned were allowed to be ‘privatised’ and their shares had to be
transferred to the integrated structure.50 At the beginning of 1998 the integrated
structure was transformed into a joint-stock company in which the state owned 100%
of the shares,51 and changes were introduced in the board of directors.52 The internal
restructuring will continue until both the decision-making process and the  nancing
are centralised.53 As regards this latter point, the  rst steps towards establishing the
group have been subject to many con icts due to the reluctance on the part of the
board of directors of the member organisations to lose their autonomy.54 The group
VPK MAPO established its nucleus in 1995 when the company Moskovskoe
aviatsionnoe PO im. P.V. Dement’eva (MAPO) absorbed the design centre OKB im.
Mikoyana i Gurevicha (MiG) (also in Moscow). Subsequently, in 1996, the VPK
MAPO was set up, which grouped together the greater part, although not all,55 of the
strategic organisations for the production of MiG aeroplanes (12 organisations in
total), besides incorporating organisations not connected to the production of MiG.56
Halfway through 1997 there was a change of directors57 and new companies were
introduced58 with the aim of consolidating it as a corporate structure.The rest of the
associations in the aviation sub-sector are in the course of being formed but prospects
of them being established as integrated structures of de nite military importance are
doubtful. Several initiatives to create a business association around the design centre
ANTK im. A. N. Tupolev (Moscow) have taken place, but the setting up of
Aviastroitel’naya kholdingovaya kompaniya Tupolev halfway through 1997 has been
the most serious attempt yet to form an integrated structure.59 This association is of
civilian importance,60 yet its military production is of little signi cance for the state.
There was also a plan to set up an association around the ANTK im. Il’yushina
(Moscow) design centre, but this has been hindered because one of the factories is in
Tashkent.61 At the end of 1997 fresh impetus was given to setting up this integrated
structure through the creation of the Aviastroitel’naya kompaniya Il’yushin, of which
the state will own at least 51% of the shares. In this case there is a two-phase plan
for the creation of the international association:  rstly, the group would include two
Russian defence organisations, which would at least transfer to the group the
state-held block of shares, and subsequently the company in Tashkent would be
incorporated.62 It is worth pointing out that the essential activity of the group would
be civilian in nature, leaving military production in the background.63 As regards the
associations set up around the OKB im. Milya (Moscow) and OKB im. Yakovleva
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(Moscow) design centres, these are still in the  rst stage of construction. However,
both centres present serious problems when it comes to being established as
associations, due as much to the reluctance on the part of the organisations in question
to join the corresponding association (for example, the case of Korporatsiya Vertolety
Mi64) as to the absence of military priority for their production.
At the second level of integrated structures, a certain restructuring has also taken
place. Speci cally, the group of businesses to be excluded from the defence sector has
been more accurately de ned, and this is a decision which limits the formation of
integrated associations within this sub-sector. An outstanding example of this is that,
out of the 15 engine manufacturers active at the moment, only three to four will be
kept within the defence industry.65 Besides supporting the consolidation of the
associations which have already been set up, the Korporatsiya Aerokosmicheskoe
oborudovanie has been created, which is closely connected to the developing of
military priorities and over which the state exercises special control.66 To the same
end, a group made up of four more organisations is being created around the NPP
Aerosila (Stupino, Moscow oblast’) whose aim is to manufacture aircraft engines,
both for civilian and military purposes.67
The intention of the rest of the defence industry’s sub-sectors is to follow the trend
set by aviation, but they do not yet seem to be as advanced. In the radio sub-sector,
for example, the creation of this type of association structure is still in its primary
phase and the government has focused its efforts on the already existing structures.
The FIG Oboronitel’nye sistemy, created in 1997, is an outstanding example. Here
the majority of the organisations in the association are state-owned or, if they
do happen to be privatised, the state holds a sizeable block of shares in them.68
Secondly, meanwhile, we can consider the case of the Kontsern Antei, which was
created in 1991 but has since raised the number of participating groups to 15.69
The peculiarity of both organisations is their specialisation in the design and
manufacture of air defence complexes, the production of which is of great military
importance.
In the rest of the defence industry sub-sectors the Ministry of Economic Affairs
restructuring has been of a more modest nature. Nevertheless, the creation of new
integrated structures has also been promoted in the electronics sub-sector. This has
been done speci cally via the setting up of at least two holding companies; the  rst
of a more civilian nature, and the second more military. The former, Rossiiskaya
Elektronika,70 over which the state continues to enjoy a substantial degree of control,
groups together 31 plants and research centres. One special feature of this holding
company is that its aim is to carry out the presidential programme ‘Razvitie
elektronnoi tekhniki v Rossii’, at the same time as it makes up the nucleus of an
international association, FIG international Elektronnye tekhnologii (FIG Eletekh).71
The creation of the holding company Voennya elektronika72 represents the second
relevant attempt to create a business group within the electronics sub-sector. This
military holding company, which will have its nucleus in Novosibirsk, is in the
process of being created, although its very establishment could be questioned owing
to the bad economic state of the groups which make it up.73
Owing to the number of types of integrated structures (associations) and the short
time they have been in existence, it is dif cult to be precise as to their impact on the
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defence sector as a whole. This situation is even more dif cult to assess in so far as
one of the objectives focused on has been the setting up of the groups. Nevertheless,
we should underline the qualitative advances made in the pilot experiments in the
aviation sector. In short, at the end of 1998, some 200 defence organisations were to
be found incorporated into integrated structures whose activity was directed towards
military production. To sum up, therefore, the impact of the creation of integrated
structures on the defence industry as a whole is small but steadily increasing.
Limits to the restructuring policy
The Ministry of Economic Affairs restructuring policy has meant a change of focus
for the defence industry reforms, characterised by greater realism. Nevertheless, it is
worth pointing out that the original aims were too ambitious given the economic
situation in both the country and the sector itself. As a result, and although
far-reaching measures have been adopted, the results in many cases have turned out
to be partial. However, it must be stressed that modi cations to the initial approach
of the restructuring programme have begun to be introduced in certain areas, as is
obvious from looking at the aviation sub-sector, which is where this type of change
has advanced the furthest.
One area where only partial decisions have been taken is at the sectoral level. An
extreme example of a sub-sector where hardly any decisions have been taken,
especially those related to the exclusion of organisations from the sector, is that of
ammunitions and special chemicals, a situation justi ed by the excessive speci city
and heterogeneous nature of this activity.74 There is a very high degree of state
participation within the sector, and even in the case of privatised organisations the
state presence is considerable. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that a not
inconsiderable number of the companies has received no orders since the beginning
of the transition.75 Therefore, this lack of decision making, coupled with the
contraction in both defence and export needs, together with the major  nancial
problems,76 will lead to a signi cant cut in the number of organisations in the
sub-sector.
The second area where there exists a de nite lack of any decision making is in the
integrated structures themselves. In the aviation sub-sector, for example, a total of six
integrated structures were initially decided on, but their future prospects are very
different. Whereas the AVPK Sukhoi is to be found in the very heart of the defence
industry, since it is possible to concentrate the most urgent priorities in the building
of military aircraft there, the situation of the VPK MAPO is in doubt. To be more
speci c, the naming of an ex-director of Sukhoi as director general of the MAPO
association may suggest the take-over of the second group by the  rst, thereby
concentrating the main body of military aircraft and helicopter construction priori-
ties.77 As to the rest of the groups, their continued place within the defence industry
is in doubt. The exclusion of the organisations connected to OKB im. Milya and OKB
Yakovleva from the defence industry is especially likely. As regards the Tupolev and
Il’yushin groups, which manufacture an important amount of products for civilian
purposes, they will be found, at the very best, on the edge of the defence industry,
due either to the lack of military orders or to their precise nature. Therefore, out of
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more than six integrated structures, it is possible that only one will continue to  nd
a place within the defence industry. A similar situation with the manufacture of
air defence complexes may arise in the radio sub-sector.78 The long-range air
defence complexes, in particular, are of primary importance and it seems likely that
the FIG Oboronitel’nye sistemy will cover this requirement. Given the tendency
towards standardising arms and eliminating organisations that ful l similar
production requirements, the Kontsern Antei would become of second-grade
importance and may see its position in the structure of the defence industry visibly
altered.79
In the third place, a situation similar to that surrounding the integrated structures
is arising at plant level, owing to the concentration of orders on one type of weapons
and the desire to avoid product duplication. In the armament sub-sector, for example,
the state’s priorities as regards greater control over the organisations themselves have
been especially focused on those which are directly involved in weapons manufacture.
Nevertheless, within this type of activity there is an order of precedence that seems
to be in uenced by the actual type of weapons made, as well as by the decisions taken
regarding the standardisation of weapon types or any overlapping production. How-
ever, the exclusion from this sector of organisations carrying out this type of activity
has been partial, and one example which illustrates this is that of the manufacture of
tanks. When the USSR split up, four companies in this line of production remained
on Russian territory, but only two carried on actively producing and kept their rank
of state-owned companies: Uralvagonzavod (Nizhnii Tagil, Sverdlovsk oblast’) and
Omskii zavod transportnogo mashinostroeniya (Omsk). Nevertheless, the tendency
towards maintaining only a modest demand for this type of vehicles has been
consolidated,80 and for this reason, as well as a decision taken in 1996 to standardise
orders for T-90 class tanks81 alone (manufactured by Uralvagonzavod), the exclusion
of the Omsk factory from the defence industry is foreseeable.
A fourth area where partial decisions have been taken is related to the exclusion of
military priorities owing to problems of technical development. The manufacture of
strategic missile-carrying atomic submarines is included in this area. In this case,
there are important obstacles to developing new-generation strategic missiles to place
in this class of submarine and, as a result, the essential element that could give this
type of craft top priority is missing. Furthermore, the excessive costs involved in
constructing submarines of this class are no incentive.82 The combination of both of
these problems leads us to consider the situation of both the manufacture of atomic
military submarines and the aforementioned classes of missiles to be a marginal one
within the area of arms priorities, and the prospects for the companies related to both
lines of production therefore come under question. It is important to emphasise that
the fall in the importance given to atomic submarines bene ts the demand prospects
of the diesel-class ones, particularly those manufactured by the FIG Morskaya
tekhnika (St Petersburg),83 where they are developed. What is more, one feature of
this association is that it could cover the modest requirement to build large military
ships through one of its member companies, Admiralteiskie ver (St Petersburg).84
In  fth place, it seems that the combining of arms production to cover both internal
and export needs has not been given enough consideration. Some of the second-level
military production lines can be combined by boosting exports, so that the production
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costs are partially covered by the demand from foreign customers. In fact, this would
mean adapting military priorities to economic conditions, although it would avoid any
worsening in the scienti c-technological level of some organisations at the same time
as permitting the continued supply to the armed forces of weapons which, while not
quite the most innovative available, are of good enough quality. Most of the
 nancial-industrial groups created with a speci cally military pro le could respond to
this type of situation.
Conclusion
From summer 1997 onwards the government’s economic policy regarding the
restructuring of the defence industry has been a relatively active one. This has been
conditioned by the desire to cover any arms needs. Although the lack of a coherent
and clearly de ned arms programme is a hindrance when it comes to giving direction
to the restructuring policy, some arms priorities have emerged (either in the shape of
preferences in the supply of arms or of exclusion of military activities) which have
shaped the policies pursued.
The present restructuring has allowed the defence industry to be rede ned, at the
same time as introducing new management mechanisms within the sector. On the  rst
point, the number of organisations belonging to the sector has been signi cantly cut
and will decrease even more in the future if the criteria behind this restructuring are
applied more strictly. As to the second point, the basic aim of the restructuring policy
has been to create integrated structures, legally regarded as joint-stock companies, in
which the state holds a block of shares; the more important the association’s military
priority, the bigger the block. In this way, the state possesses a mechanism of control
over the activity of the business ensemble, and particularly the military side, at the
same time as distancing itself from the running and  nancing of these groups.
Likewise, on the one hand, these associations become instruments to extend the use
of economic criteria in the defence sector’s working guidelines and, on the other, they
permit the introduction of subsequent restructuring within the groups, so that a later
reduction in the size of the sector may be achieved.
What is more, from among the new ways of running the sector, the state’s interest
in increased control over the defence organisations must be stressed. An active
management renovation policy has been developed via the direct appointment of the
boards of directors in the state-owned organisations and through the naming of state
representatives in the shareholders’ assemblies and on the boards of directors in the
privatised ones.
The restructuring policy has created a framework within which changes in the
manufacture of arms in the defence industry can be developed. The aim is to
manufacture a smaller quantity of arms but to a high degree of quality (with
high-level technological components and very advanced performance), but only
following certain top-priority lines (selectively chosen) and more closely adapted to
the emergence of regional military con icts. One exception to this is the upkeep of
massive destruction nuclear weapons, although markedly fewer than during the Soviet
period. The achievement of such objectives will appear to be quali ed in a period of
transition in which part of the arsenal inherited from the Soviet period will be kept
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active. The modernisation of the weapons will allow them either a longer life-span or
a widening (or improvement) of their functions at a relatively low cost, and will make
the transition easier.
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